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Theory versus History of Social Economy1
Basically, any subject of human empirical cognition admits of a twofold 
approach: first, from the point of view of relationships between the com-
ponents of reality in a given moment, or every moment, regardless of 
time and, second, from the point of view of the sequence and causality 
of the components of reality in time. This is why the same subject can be 
the focus of theoretical and nomothetical sciences, as well as idiographic, 
genetic and historical ones, depending on the terminology adopted. This 
duality of approach concerns the entire gamut of human cognition, despite 
appearances to the contrary. However, it has one aspect in the natural sci-
ences and a different one in the moral sciences, as they were once called, 
which are now more often known as the humanities, of which a consider-
able portion could be classified as social sciences. The subject matter of 
physics, chemistry and biology is quite explicit, while the history of the 
development of the form of this same subject matter is the focus of geol-
ogy, palaeontology and other similar sciences. However, the difference 
and variety of the scope and aspect of the studied phenomena are so con-
siderable in this case that differentiating between these sciences does not 
pose any problems. 
1 Translated from E. Taylor, Teoria a historia gospodarstwa społecznego, “Ruch Prawniczy, 
Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 1962, 2, pp. 121–130 by Tomasz Żebrowski and proof-
read by Stephen Dersley and Ryszard Reisner. The translation and proofreading were fi-
nanced by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education under 848/2/P-DUN/2018.
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It is a different story with the humanities, even more so with the 
social sciences, which are the primary concern here. Their subject mat-
ter as a rule admits of the dual approach mentioned earlier. Philology, 
grammar and stylistics have linguistics as their counterpart, which stud-
ies the history of language. Next to law studies, there is the history of 
law. It would seem that political and social histories have no theoretical 
counterparts. Meanwhile, sociology may be playing this role quite well, 
though it has perhaps not gone far enough in this direction yet. How-
ever, it has for a long time already been the case that economic history 
has accompanied the development of economics or political economy, 
whatever it is called, when understood as a theoretical science. 
As far as economics is concerned, a certain confusion of ideas has 
been developing for a long time in this respect; deplorable misunder-
standings and misconceptions have taken place, laden with far-reaching 
theoretical and practical consequences. This confusion of ideas takes 
two principal forms, concerning two issues that slightly differ from each 
other but are nonetheless closely tied and intertwined. These are, on 
the one hand, the distinction between the subjects of economics and eco-
nomic history, and on the other, the viewing of economic development 
in terms of certain regularities. 
Undeniably, the subject matter of the research of both economics and 
economic history is phenomena of exactly the same kind and scope. These 
are economic phenomena, that is, ones concerning social income, specifi-
cally the production, exchange and distribution of goods and services which 
making up social income. The only cause of contention in this regard is the 
scope of services included in it. Prima facie, unless one ponders the mat-
ter seriously, the simplest and – at the same time, to put it bluntly – the 
crudest way of drawing the distinction springs to mind. This involves dis-
tinguishing the areas of research pursued in the two fields in question by 
applying the criterion of a point in time to their common researchable phe-
nomena. Thus, what has passed is assigned to economic history, while what 
is now and continues to be, belongs to the theory of economics. 
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The distinction is indeed a mechanical one, but it is very convenient 
and expedient as a convention. It was commonly used in our country 
when Polish economic history was emerging and taking its first inde-
pendent steps. Among our scholars in this field, a versatile, ingenious 
and subtle polymath, Franciszek Bujak, did not overly stress this ap-
proach but another profound and conscientious mind, Jan Rutkowski, 
was quite fond of it. After the First World War, he held that economic 
phenomena from before the war belonged to economic history, while 
after the Second World War, he assigned the phenomena that occurred 
prior to the war to this history. Naturally, he was not absolutely strict 
about the distinction, allowing for exceptions and making the distinction 
dependent on a number of conditions. 
However, I have the impression that the successors of these great 
masters and many other Polish economic historians have changed this 
distinction—rather conventional in nature—into a dogma. They tend 
to think that if economists make past facts the subject of their study, 
they thereby encroach on their turf—like a poacher who does not be-
long there. They believe that if research is concerned with 19th-century 
facts, or even, say, the interwar period in Poland, ipso facto it belongs to 
economic history and thus it must be studied, necessarily and exclusive-
ly, by an economic historian and only the latter may supervise a doctoral 
dissertation in this field. 
It seems that this stance is absolutely wrong and smacks of a division 
of labour between craftsmen or qualified workers implemented through 
agreements and work rules, and regulations or administrative provisions 
concerning particular occupations. Can research work be subject to such 
simplified and conventional divisions?
What does the work of economists and economic historians consist 
in? Economic theorists study economic phenomena in terms of such 
characteristics that are common to them and are prone to generalisa-
tions. For this purpose, they disregard the accidental or individual char-
acteristics of particular phenomena and isolate them from the impact of 
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their various configurations. They look for that which is more or less 
common, study various forms of relationships between phenomena and 
the conditions under which they occur, and try to establish the degree 
and kind of their universality, depending on various conditions. Mean-
while, the field of interest of economic historians covers something 
completely different. Their research focuses above all on establish-
ing facts, wherever they are not absolutely certain, followed by finding 
any causality between them in the unique form of their unique sequence. 
In this way, they obtain a presentation and investigation of a sequence of 
facts over time in their entire diversity and completeness. 
Obviously, these two types of research are interdependent and over-
lap. An economic historian in presenting and explaining a sequence of 
facts must make use of the concepts and causalities or interdependences 
developed by an economic theorist and, on the other hand, an economist 
must use the facts and interdependences established by an economic 
historian. On many an occasion, in certain areas, one type of work can 
be hardly distinguished from the other. In particular where the establish-
ment of facts does not pose any difficulty, as for instance, where new or 
recent times are involved, economists, to achieve their research goals, 
must establish facts and their unique course and sequence. However, 
in such a case they encroach on the field of historical studies and more 
or less competently take on the role of historians. Likewise, economic 
historians may sometimes be forced to create a new research tool for 
themselves in the form of a concept or a kind of interdependence if 
they are not satisfied by those provided by theory. However, such a tool, 
naturally, will be rather temporary, as it will be closely adjusted to the 
subject matter at hand and thus may not be general or universal enough. 
However, despite these mutual encroachments on their respective 
research turf, it is clear that the difference between the fields of learn-
ing under discussion does not lie in the time in which the studied facts 
arose, or the subject of research, but rather in the research method and 
goal. One research method is used for theory, and another one for his-
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tory. Theoretical study and historical study pursue different goals This is 
where the borderline between research by economic theorists and eco-
nomic historians runs. 
It is obvious that the generalisations arrived at by an economist stem 
not only from the present experiences but also past ones, from the ac-
cumulated knowledge and facts often supplied by economic historians. 
After all, for instance, although the beginnings of the quantity theory of 
money reach back to certain findings from the 16th and 17th centuries 
concerning contemporary events, its development is an outcome of long 
research into a more distant or more recent past. The research was veri-
fied by the study of the quite recent past, such as David Ricardo’s work 
on inflation during the Napoleonic Wars and afterwards. After all, his 
High Price of Bullion2 cannot possibly be classed as historical scholar-
ship. Nobody will include Thomas Tooke’s famous study of the long-
term movement of prices and money supply entitled History of Prices 
in economic history either. The study was not only crucial for the theory 
of money and credit, but also of considerable significance for economic 
history. Neither will anybody include the great work Purchasing Power 
of Money by Irving Fisher3 in economic history, despite the fact that it 
relies on a meticulous long-term analysis of prices and money supply. 
The same is true for a more recent work, namely the two-volume excel-
lent work Theory of Prices by A.W. Marget4, already published in part 
prior to WWII. 
To pass to another area of research, the entire theory of business 
cycles, or boom-and-bust if you wish, was born and developed—be-
ginning with Clémant Juglar to W.C. Mitchell and contemporary theo-
rists—by tracing the fluctuations of production, price, money and credit 
curves for the whole period from the early 19th century. Does the fa-
2 D. Ricardo, The High Price of Bullion: A Proof of the Depreciation of Bank Notes, London 
1810.
3 I. Fisher Purchasing Power of Money. Its Determination and Relation to Credit, Interest 
and Crises, New York 1920.
4 A.W. Marget, The Theory of Prices, New York 1938. 
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mous work Business Cycles by W.C. Mitchell5 belong to economic his-
tory because it studies not only the present but above all the past? Don’t 
theorists have a right to rely on historical induction carried out by others 
or themselves? Can’t they verify their theoretical claims using data from 
the past?
This author believes that such a stance would be clearly absurd. 
What matters most is how, using what method, for what purpose and 
from what point of view a given group of facts is considered, regardless 
of whether they belong to the past or the present. Besides, how very 
artificial and frail this distinction is, between the present and the past. In 
spite of all upheavals, reality is continuous and the past imperceptibly 
turns into the present: our roots are always in the past, while the present 
gives sense to the past. 
There is no doubt that economics may base its generalisations on 
the study of the systematised facts which pertain to the present. To this 
end, it uses the descriptive method as a tool. It resembles the historical 
method and its results form a branch of economics sometimes referred 
to as descriptive economics. However, it may also be well-supported by 
facts from the past, and the further back it reaches, the more it needs the 
material supplied and digested by economic history. Moreover, it must 
always be careful to be competent enough in cases where it establishes 
facts and connections between them by itself, out of necessity, because 
economic history has not processed a given portion of material yet. 
Now, we arrive at the most significant aspect of the dispute. No econ-
omist in their right mind would take facts from distant past, to use them 
as grounds for theoretical generalisations, from somewhere else than the 
works of economic historians or historians as such. The matter becomes 
awkward only in relation to recent times, the memories of which persist 
in the current generation and supply material for study from one’s own 
observations and experiences or easily accessible sources of informa-
tion. In this time range, the historian and theorist meet. It even looks as 
5 A.F. Burns, W.C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, New York 1946.
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if they have competed with each other since they describe and present 
the same material. A historian does this to record the course of events, 
while a theorist has to reconstruct these events and their course when the 
historian has not processed them or has not accounted for this aspect of 
phenomena that the theorist is interested in. However, a different goal 
is pursued by a historian and a different one by a theorist. They use dif-
ferent methods. The fact that they both study the same scope of facts is 
not only recommended and desirable but also proper. 
An example will elucidate the matter for us. A great deal of interest 
is aroused by economic phenomena related to covering the costs of the 
reconstruction of the country and government expenses largely through 
the issuance of paper money in Poland in the period of inflation in 1919–
1927. An economic historian has a lot to work on to trace the course 
of economic phenomena, present attempts at a reform, their successes 
and failures, and policies pursued, etc. However, the same issues, after 
they are determined and causal connections between them are estab-
lished, are of great significance for theorists. They may also determine 
these issues, if they have not been determined accurately enough yet, or 
guide them in the direction of questions they wish to investigate. One 
of such questions could be inflation, that is, the relationship between 
changes in the amount of money and the availability of credit, on the one 
hand, and the rates of exchange, prices, interest, entrepreneur’s profit, 
wages, manufacturing and national income on the other. It is quite clear 
that historians will not do this work without appropriate education and 
talent. If they have them, some conclusions might be ventured, but then 
such historians would be acting as theorists. This kind of work calls 
for a theorist, but a theorist will welcome the work of a historian, sup-
plying and interpreting facts concerning a given period. Theorists will 
gladly avail themselves of them but if they are not available, they must 
do the descriptive work on their own and tie it to theoretical investiga-
tions. The presentation and preliminary processing of material will not 
pose any major difficulties, owing to the availability and abundance of 
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sources. Thus, both a historian and a theorist may work in this area, but 
each pursuing a different goal and employing a different method. 
Let us turn to another issue, very close to the previous one in both 
time and nature, namely, the course the Great Depression took in inter-
war Poland in 1929–1933 or even 1929–1937. What a rich and multi-
faceted area of research it is for a historian. However, yet more interest-
ing, or even exciting questions arise here for an economic theorist. The 
analysis of the adopted economic policies – especially monetary, credit 
and fiscal policies – and their effectiveness, helps decide if the so-called 
classic policy of credit crunch and constant value of money is effective, 
and under what conditions, for overcoming a crisis. Alternatively, if the 
policy of liberal credit and directed money, aimed at full employment, is 
more or less effective, and if so under what conditions 
An analogous problem springs to mind as a subject of investiga-
tion of paramount importance for a theorist in even more recent times, 
namely, the “economic miracle” in West Germany in the years follow-
ing the Second World War. Do theorists have to refrain from theoreti-
cal investigations only because no historian has studied this problem? 
Even if a historian has studied it, in all likelihood their work will not 
supply a theorist with the specific information they are most interested 
in, because of the special question they are working on. A historian is 
not aware of the significance of certain pieces of information for the 
issue at stake. Is a theorist then to stop encroaching on the descriptive 
and historical study of the relevant material in such a situation? Such 
a stance would be narrow-minded and pedantic. 
Let us stress yet once again: it is not the time range, but rather the 
goal and method of research that separate the research subjects of eco-
nomics and economic history. It appears that the simplifications and 
ideas of economic historians which are inconsistent with this view, are, 
to some degree, a belated response to, and a relic of, a certain long-
passed period in the development of economics. In it, the criticism of the 
principle of economy, being a foundation of generalisations in economic 
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theory, since it was conceived of as a motive of action, led the older 
German historical school to the assertion that economic laws were of 
a historical nature. Next, the conclusion was finally drawn that there 
were no theoretical economic laws whatsoever, economic theory could 
not exist and it should be replaced by economic history and the laws of 
development it formulated. 
As a result, the teaching of economics morphed into the teaching 
of economic history and the ways of developing social economy, while 
chairs of economics were taken over by economic historians. Thus, 
Gustav F. von Schmoller, the representative of an already not so radi-
cal younger realistic historical school, excited by a dispute with Carl 
Menger, said loudly that at German universities, at the chairs of social 
economy, there was no place for abstract theorists and that positions 
were only available for realistic historians6 (Untersuchungen über die 
Methode der Sozialwissenschaften, 1883). The rule was also extended to 
the history of economic thought, although by its very nature it can only 
be practiced successfully by an expert theorist. However, since theory 
was to be replaced by history, in this field, too, a theorist was to be re-
placed by a historian. The outcomes of this attitude were deplorable, as 
were the ensuing appointments to professorships. Germany paid very 
dearly for them. Economics soon went into decline there, almost col-
lapsed and stopped being respected abroad. Only slowly and gradually, 
against great obstacles, did it recover in the 20th century. As far as prac-
tice is concerned, the catastrophic inflation in Germany after the First 
World War resulted to a large extent from the so-called state theory de-
veloped by G.F. Knapp, which prevailed in Germany as regards money. 
It was a product of the anti-theoretical Historical School of economics. 
The conclusions drawn by the Historical School, in particular the 
older one, from the proposition on the historic nature of economic laws 
were completely wrong. They followed from the ambiguity of the prop-
6 C. Menger, Untersuchungen über die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften, Leipzig 1883.
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osition in question. The proposition itself, properly understood and in-
terpreted, is absolutely right and real. 
It is undeniably right to say that economic laws are historically 
determined. Depending on the generality and universality of their as-
sumptions, they concern some shorter or longer development periods 
while those that use the most general assumptions are valid in respect 
of several development periods or even may concern any aspect of so-
cial economy in general, admitting of some general common assump-
tions. The younger historical school found, because of the evolution of 
its views, that there existed similar, so-called “periodic” economic laws. 
Marxism, too, after initial misunderstandings, believes now in a similar 
historic nature of economic laws. It admits not only single-period, but 
also multi-period or “common” economic laws, as they are called by Os-
kar Lange.7 The latter extend to “all social formations whose economic 
base has … common characteristics”, which often makes their opera-
tion very regular. These single- or multi-period laws are theoretic and 
nomothetic in character. They ought to be distinguished from another 
understanding of the historic nature of economic laws, namely, as laws 
of development or laws of economic development. At this juncture, we 
arrive at the second question, relating to the proper distinction between 
the scopes of research of economics and economic history. 
In essence, development laws cannot substitute for theoretical eco-
nomic laws, nor may they replace them. They concern different things. 
The questions they are expected to answer are simply different. Their 
goal is to provide causal explanations of how the quantities of the eco-
nomic system changed over time, accounting for their interdependence 
and relationships. Since what is meant here is how past phenomena 
changed over time, a historical approach naturally comes to mind, prima 
facie so to speak. Thus, economic historians usually believe that it is 
their task to make such a synthesis and discover laws of development. 
Many such syntheses have been made, relying on the study of the most 
7 O. Lange, Ekonomia polityczna I, Warszawa 1959, p. 65.
Theory versus History… | 487 
important characteristics of the past and their mutual ties, and project-
ing the experience gathered hitherto onto the future. Though frequently 
very interesting and suggestive, they are as a rule are one-sided, since 
they suffer from a fundamental, unavoidable and inevitable defect aris-
ing from the very heart of the matter, namely the incompleteness of in-
duction and latitude in generalisations. As a result, they easily move 
onto the field of philosophy of history. 
However, contrary to the practice and opinions of economic histori-
ans, it is also possible to approach economic development theoretically. 
Not everything that has happened and occurs in time must necessarily 
be approached from a historical point of view. As regards the generali-
sations of causalities and interdependences, rather than their individual 
occurrence, the field is wide open for theoretical studies. Economists of 
the past tried to consider economic development by building its model 
on the basis of certain assumptions and assertions regarding the chang-
es of and relationships between particular economic factors. Such at-
tempts sometimes also offer a vision of the end of development. Adam 
Smith revealed the principal reason of changes in an economic system, 
namely accumulation and investment, and also another collaborative 
one, namely technological progress related to the division of labour. 
With the classical economists, who introduced the third factor of popu-
lation growth, in particular David Ricardo, a clear theory of develop-
ment had emerged, which was later used by Karl Marx, who advanced 
a consistent, comprehensive and independent theory of development. 
Assuming the classical construction of a diverse, not necessarily explicit 
connection between the changes of economic factors, John Stuart Mill 
suggested the possible existence of a few variously combined models of 
economic development. 
Ultimately, all these theories encompass more than just economic 
phenomena, the ties between them and interdependences. They go be-
yond these, advancing propositions on the changes of economic factors. 
In some, this is conscious and deliberate, as is the case with Marxism, 
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which wants to give—and gives—more than a mere theory of economic 
life. Where this is unconscious and unintentional, an unsatisfactory dis-
tinction between historical problems, possibly even philosophical and 
sociological ones, and theoretic-economic ones, is to blame. 
At present, there is a tendency in economics to approach from 
a different angle the question of changes in the quantities of an eco-
nomic system. This reflects the need to make a cognitive distinction 
between the changes of quantities, or economic system elements, fol-
lowing from their interaction in movement and the changes thereof 
following from changes in economic factors. In that case, the analysis 
of one’s own changes of economic factors is not necessary anymore. 
Research in such a limited scope is referred to with the new name of 
theory of growth, to distinguish it from the broader concept of economic 
development. The latter also encompasses economic factors being prac-
tically and in principle independent variables of an economic system. 
If they are brought into the equation, it becomes complicated and less 
comprehensible. 
This stance is right and justified. The theory of economics does not 
have to limit itself to statics only, to the study of how dependent vari-
ables, or system elements, adjust to the movement of external indepen-
dent variables that upset the balance of the former. It may and should 
build economic dynamics and it is the theory of growth that attempts to 
make economic research more dynamic in response to widespread calls. 
It should provide a theory of the process of changes of interrelated quan-
tities, or economic elements, as they interact as a result of and during 
movement. These elements include the quantities, their growths and 
losses, of capital, production, consumption, investment and accumula-
tion. Furthermore, it must be able to explain not only the mechanism of 
movement, but also its forms, such as cyclicity, and find out whether 
their causes are endogenous or possibly exogenous. 
The theory of growth understood in this way has two different trends, 
employing two different methods. One determines simply the direction 
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and ways social economy has hitherto changed in time, and various con-
figurations of the underlying causes. Actually, this is still a historic ap-
proach that only slightly deepens the traditional theory  of development. 
It does not provide any insight into the mechanism of changes. This is 
the character of the syntheses by some economists such as W.A, Lew-
is, W.W. Rostow and others. The other trend closely reflects the meth-
odological assumptions of the theory of growth. It has already pro-
duced interesting results, in the work of Michał Kalecki, R.S. Harrod, 
E.D. Domar and others, showing that the influence of historicism has 
already been shaken off. Consequently, it provides a deeper independent 
insight into economic phenomena and after its results are combined with 
the results of other studies, it is capable of providing effective guidelines 
for managing and planning economic life. 
As can be seen from the above brief review, the introduction of the 
conception of alleged development laws by historicism paradoxically 
led in fact to the opposite effect, i.e. to the rise of a nomothetic theory of 
growth. This was only possible thanks to the precise and proper sepa-
ration of the subjects of research of economic theory and history. The 
misunderstanding as to the subject of research pursued by these two 
branches of learning and separating them using the criterion of the time 
at which the studied phenomena occurred and not that of the goal and 
method of study, has proven to be disastrous — always and everywhere. 
The research in these branches must be based on correct methodological 
assumptions. Then, they do not get in each other’s way and harmoni-
ously collaborate for the benefit of human knowledge. 
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